SOUTH AFRICAN COLONEL

Frank Parker Stevenson was born in Birkenhead, near Liverpool in 1897, and during World War I he served in the British Navy.  After the war he immigrated to Australia, where he worked as a teacher, and where his life, like that of many emigrants, suddenly became colorful – even more colorful than most.  He married and had three children.  After a short solo sojourn in New Zealand, he returned to his family in Australia, and then he emigrated back to England – and all this in less than one decade. 
In 1930 he emigrated once again – this time to the Union of South Africa, just as Australia, a part of the British Empire; there he also worked as a teacher, this time in a metal trade’s school in Durban.  It was in Durban that shortly before the outbreak of the war, he again married. In 1940, he volunteered for military service and was sent to North Africa.  As of June 1, 1941 he served in a communications company and on June 20, 1942 he was taken prisoner at Tobruk. It was for his efforts during this war, ensuring communication at Bardia and Salum in Libya that he received the Order of the British Empire,   His service records show him as MIA for a period of two months and only in August, 1942 did the Red Cross confirm that Stevenson was held in Oflag IV B as POW No. 12683. On September 9, 1942 the London Gazette listed Frank Parker Stevenson as the recipient of the OBE for his services. On December 31, 1942, Stevenson was transferred to Oflag IX A/Z, where after some eight weeks Lt. Colonel Van Vliet and Captain Stewart would arrive.
In selecting the English-speaking group for travel to Katyn, the Germans intended that in the British group there would be not only Englishmen, but also representatives of the dominions.  In reality, as becomes apparent from Brigadier Nicholson’s note of protest which was written in this case – Stevenson was not the Senior South African Officer (SSAO) held as a POW – but the Germans designated him as a member of the Katyn delegation.
As earlier noted, during the trip to Berlin, there existed a version of whom the members of the group were, according to it, the Senior Allied and British officer was to be Brigadier Somerset of Oflag IX A/H, and it has not been possible to determine why he did not embark on this journey.  In any case, in light of Somerset’s absence, it was Frank Stevenson who suddenly became the Senior Officer in the officer group.  Van Vliet, writing in his 1950 report, clearly noted:

Lt.Col. Stevenson was the senior in the group/

In truth, Lt. Colonel Stevenson, in the absence of other senior officers, very consciously (and it would appear eagerly) took command of the group, but nonetheless the circumstances were undoubtedly a surprise for him.  Despite his rank, Stevenson was a reserve officer, and the realization that as of that moment he was assuming responsibility for the actions of his fellow witnesses in a situation which was completely murky in every respect and full of enormous risk, must have impacted on his behavior. In reading the recollections of other members of the group, we learn that Stevenson was very conscious of his role as the ‘Senior Officer’ in the group which was taken to Katyn; additionally, he had to be a difficult individual, since the normalcy circumspect Gilder referred to him as the ‘paranoid South African’.

It is highly probable that this paranoia and the need to completely control the situation arose precisely from an understanding of the enormity of the responsibility which had suddenly fallen on Stevenson.  In the final review, that behavior carried certain positive traits with it: Stevenson advised the members of the group that they could not agree to any proposals made by the Germans (including those that they speak on the matter, which could then be used by Goebbels propaganda machine).  Nonetheless,  after viewing the graves in Katyn, Colonel Stevenson must have undergone a trauma – and as becomes clear from both Van Vliet’s and Gilder’s reports – he swore that he would write a book about Katyn, which in the circumstances would have served German interests

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SEEKING TWO BRITISH MEDICAL MEN

The Germans clearly wanted to also ensure that among the POWs being taken to Katyn, medical personnel would be present.

By including English-speaking medical personnel in the group, who could professionally appraise the exhumations conducted by Dr. Buhtz and the doctors of the Polish Red Cross, who were working in Katyn, they would ensure credibility.  They therefore sent orders to the Lazarette in Rottenmunster (Oflag VB) that the POWs working in that hospital should designate two of the prisoners working there to travel.  However, in this case – similarly to that of Frank Stroobant, the civilian, they had to utilize a certain amount of coercion.

Capt. Dr. Stanley Gilder, who was the Senior British Officer (SBO) in the Lazarette, and who ultimately was designated as a member of the group of witnesses, described the circumstances in the following manner:

…I was sent for by Dr. Essig of the German Stabsartz.  On arriving in his office, I found him at the telephone and he informed that he had just received an OKW [Oberkommando der Wehrmacht] order (…) to send two British prisoners to Berlin, whence they would be flown to Russia to see the mass graves at Katyn. His orders were that one prisoner from the Dominions and one ‘Inselbriten’ i.e. one from the British Isles should go. I protested that this was unwarranted involvement of prisoners in political affairs, and he [Essig] repeated that it was an order. Two men would be sent, but we would be allowed to choose them.  He required an answer as soon as possible. After discussion with my two colleagues, Captain W. Lumsden R.A.M.C. and Captain G. Gorrie R.A.M.C., it was agreed that one of us should go, especially as Captain Gorrie was in a position to transmit short messages home. During the discussion, Dr. Essig came in and asked our decision.  On hearing that we had decided on a doctor, he told me that I would go. ... My colleagues thought that it would be an advantage if I went since I speak German and Russian.

Surprisingly, although the Germans had ordered two men to go – they acceded to having only Dr. Gilder go to Katyn.

But who was Captain Stanley S.B. Gilder? Stanley Stuart Browne Gilder was actually a Scotsman born on July 14, 1909 in Edinburgh.  Gilder finished his medical studies in Cardiff and started working in Eastbourne, near the English Channel.  At the start of the war, Gilder volunteered for duty with the Territorial Army and was assigned to the 21^st General Hospital; he served in France, where he was taken prisoner in May, 1940, after the battle of Boulogne.

Captain Gilder was sent to Oflag VB in Rottenmunster/Rottweil, where the former mental hospital of St. Vincent de Paul had been converted into a hospital for prisoners of various nationalities.  Two other POWs, working as nurses in the hospital, played a role in the Katyn trip and in our knowledge about it.  The first was a New Zealander, Sergeant David Suttie – a medic taken prisoner on Crete, and most probably one of the rank and file witnesses to Katyn, who will be discussed in a later chapter.   The second was Richard Early, who also volunteered at the very start of the war and served in an ambulance unit formed by the Quakers. It is Early, who writing his memoirs (published in 1984) not only wrote at length about Gilder, but who also asked him for his recollections about the Katyn trip. For researchers, Early’s memoirs are significant not only for the fact that they describe Gilder in the Oflag, but also because they confirm that he returned to England in the spring of 1944.

Richard Early presents Gilder as a sympathetic, caring individual, who always was concerned about his patients, he described how Gilder expended all efforts in caring for the ill and wounded of various nations who were admitted to his hospital.  In light of the fact that Gilder had regular contact with the Germans, who served as guards in the hospital, as well as with the nuns whose buildings these were, he managed to learn German from them.  Additionally, there were among his POW patients a number of Russians, and from them he managed to learn some Russian.  This knowledge of languages – no less than his medical profession – formed a tripartite influence on his future wartime experiences.

The first occurrence was the fact that he was designated to go to Katyn.  As previously mentioned, the Germans certainly must have considered it advisable to have among the group of English-speaking POWs an individual with medical knowledge, and that was the basis for the order which was sent to the Lazarette in Rottenmunster.  Since Captain Gilder, was the only doctor who spoke some German, the final choice fell upon him  (as an aside, it should be noted that these language abilities as well as the fact that he came from another camp, and not from Oflag IX A/Z, initially created a lack of trust  on the part of the remaining officers.

The second occurrence – was the fact that his language abilities were finally not only accepted but in fact utilized by the remaining officers, including Colonel Frank Stevenson who recalled the matter in his report:

..was later to be of valuable assistance to the party by virtue of his sound knowledge of the Russian and German languages.

This then, is the reason, why Gilder appears front and center on many of the Katyn photographs, either in discussion with the Germans, or speaking with a Russian witness, with Stevenson in the background. It is interesting to note that the Germans in Katyn must not have been aware of Gilder’s linguistic abilities, since even General von Gersdorff, in his testimony to the Committee, stated under oath that the witnesses did not speak any foreign languages:

© Krystyna Piórkowska

COLONEL THOMAS D DRAKE

Applying similar logic with respect to the US prisoners, the Germans demanded that Colonel Thomas D. Drake, recently commander of the 168^th Infantry Regiment, taken prisoner in North Africa no more than two months earlier, travel to Katyn.  However, they were not successful in this, as the Colonel refused to go.   Drake was held in Oflag VII B, located in Eichstätt, Bavaria, which British Lieutenant Peter Conder uniquely among other POW descriptions of their camps as:

“as near to paradise as possible in a prison camp"

The best known of the English-speaking witnesses to Katyn, Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr., was not the highest ranking US POW in the III Reich – and pursuant to the initial Nazi plans, he was not the person that was to be sent to Smolensk.

In the spring of 1943, the senior ranking US Army officer in German captivity was Colonel Thomas D. Drake – prisoner No. O-015384.  Drake was certainly a unique individual.  He was born in 1901 in a small coalmining community in West Virginia.  During the World War I he volunteered for army service, where he started as a private, and received the Distinguished Service Cross for his exploits during the war.  He then remained in military service, reaching the rank of an infantry colonel and assignment as regiment commander.  During battles in North Africa (starting in November of 1942), Colonel Drake commanded the 168^th Infantry Regiment, which served as part of the 34^th Big Red Infantry Division.  Drake was a zealous martinet, and in Tunisia his soldiers called him “Quack Quack”.  As regiment commander he was known for his brutality:

In Tunisia, Col Thomas Drake, of the US army, told his officers to kill any of their men who left the line without permission, adding: "Teach all personnel to hate the Germans, and to kill them at every opportunity. I will notify you when I want prisoners taken.”

Lt. Colonel Van Vliet, who at that time assumed command of the III battalion in Drake’s regiment, cordially detested his commander (and wrote about this to his family) and was not singular in this dislike.  In February of 1943, these two officers – together with over 1600 other US Army officers were taken prisoner by the Germans in the battle of Kasserine Pass.  This battle was the first major encounter of the US Army and concurrently it’s first major defeat, and is a battle still studied at the Army College.

Lt. Colonel John K. Waters (son-in-law of General Patton and a later US Army general, was taken prisoner together with Van Vliet and Stewart) reminisced about Colonel Drake in his “Oral History Project” interview.  Waters and Drake were taken to the oflag in Eichstätt; later, when the Germans opened what became the largest US Army Oflag in Szubin (Altburgund) which was numbered Oflag 64, they all were transferred there and Colonel Drake became POW commander of the Oflag.  At the beginning, in the camps where Americans were held, no military structure was observed; however, in Szubin – as Waters recollected, Drake rapidly organized the camp according to the Code of Military Conduct. Waters then proceeded to present as apt a recollection of Colonel Drake’s character as could be found anywhere.  When the camp latrines needed to be emptied out in order to clean them, the Germans demanded that the Americans clean their latrines, they received the following reply:

…These are officers and will be treated as officers…You have those Polish people, those Russian soldiers, they can clean the latrines….

Amazingly, General Waters did not see such remarks as reflecting poorly on his commanding officer, but saw them as a positive. 

Despite some later statements, it would appear that Drake was not accorded with great favor by all the officers under his command in the camp; what is particularly significant is the fact that Captain Stewart, testifying for over two hours before the Madden Committee (October 11, 1951) did not mention him once by name.

If the Germans were dealing with the Americans in an analogical manner to the way they were dealing with the British, it should have been Colonel Drake who should have gone to Katyn as the SAO.  Confirmation of this theory can be found in the history of the 34^th Big Red Infantry history, where Drake confirmed that he received such orders but refused them:

The Germans came to him and told him that he was on an investigating committee…Lt. Col. Drake says he and other prisoner officers felt it was a complete ruse and refused.

It is highly surprising that the Germans did not manage to have an officer who was a POW to comply with their demand; an officer who could not claim age or reasons of health. Perhaps, we should ascribe the Germans failure to the character of the colonel, since according to Waters, Colonel Schneider, the German commander of Oflag 64:

                In plain language – he simply feared Drake.

These various descriptions of Drake, including his contemptuous remarks about Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr. and Captain Donald B. Stewart, were confirmed by Drake in a letter he wrote in 1952.

 

© Krystyna Piórkowska

SENIOR OFFICER IN CAPTIVITY

Just as with the forensic scientists the Germans wanted to have the ‘most important’ individuals brought to Katyn.  Their original plans had been that a group of no less than fourteen, and possibly as many as sixteen men was to be brought to Smolensk.

The Senior British Officer or SBO in captivity was Major General Sir Victor Morven Fortune (1883-1949) – former Commander of the 51^st Infantry Division, taken prisoner in France in June of 1940 and held in Oflag IX A/H. However, in consideration of his age, he had turned 60 in 1943; the Germans “graciously” relieved him of the responsibility that he undertake the journey, even allowing him to designate which of the remaining captive British generals would replace him.  (As a side note, General Fortune had such a sense of propriety; that although he was offered the opportunity to return home in a prisoner exchange program he refused; and remained a POW until liberation in 1945.) All indications were that the next English officer, in line of seniority, would go to Katyn – and that was Brigadier Claude Nicholson, who as commander of the 30^th Infantry Brigade, had also been taken prisoner in France in the spring of 1940.  At the time the English-speaking group was being finalized, Nicholson served as Prisoner Camp Commander of Oflag IX A/Z.  Ultimately, however, General Fortune decided otherwise:

The following Wednesday, Brigadier Nicholson was informed by Hauptmann Heyl, that he would not be required to journey to Katyn as the General had instructed Brig. Somerset of  Oflag IX A/H to deputise for him.

The cause for this change in decision is not clear; Brigadier Nicholson died while still a prisoner, on June 17, 1943 and perhaps, four weeks earlier, his physical condition was already such that he could not travel.  It should be surmised that the Germans accepted the proposed replacement quite readily; since Nicholson was to be replaced by an officer of similar rank. Brigadier Nigel Fitzroy Somerset, who similarly to Nicholson had, during the French campaign commanded an infantry company (the 145^th) and that he had been taken prisoner in a manner similar to that of his senior colleagues.

It does take a bit of effort to comprehend at first, but the Germans had Ilags – camps for civilian POWs, Soldags – camps for enlisted men and Oflags – which were for officers.  Now the fact is that there was an issue with airmen who often had differing ranks, but in general that was how camps were split.  Additionally, a single officer’s camp such as Oflag IX could have a number of sub-camps – thus Oflag IX A/H and Oflag IX A/Z were different camps although located reasonably near each other.  

Finally, and this is where it becomes somewhat complex, the Hague Convention, which regulated that officers were to be held in different camps than enlisted mean (the former could not be required to work) also regulated that the men had to be held in camps designated for specific national groups.  Thus, there were cases, such as with the camp in Szubin, a town incorporated into Germany after the invasion of 1939, and renamed Altburgund, where the original camp was Oflag XXI B and French officers were held there.  However, after the US Army suffered defeats in North Africa, in the late spring of 1943, the French were removed and the camp renamed Oflag 64.  Thus, when reading about POWs it is often easier to remember the camp designation, than the town name, as although both could change, once a national POW was sent to a location it tended to retain that number for the duration.

© Krystyna Piórkowska

SEEKING A FORESTER AND DINNER IN BERLIN

As soon as Dr. Orsós had announced his opinion concerning the transplanting of the conifers, the Germans were confounded – was his opinion correct?  Immediately they sent out orders to all units in Smolensk seeking any soldier who was a forester.

Dr. Zietz described it thus

Then one of the participants asked whether or not there was a forestry expert of the army group present. Professor Buhtz replied in the affirmative, and called up from the very same room that a forestry expert should report at once. He actually appeared within a few minutes, and he had no inkling as to what he was supposed to say. That was Mr. von Herff. Now, Mr. von Herff took one look at the microscope, and, I wish to emphasize, right on the spur of the moment, without having been told before what the subject of the discussion was, said, "This tree here has been standing in one place for 3 years, here is a notch, and it has been standing in another place 2 years prior to that."

Fritz von Herff, a forester, most probably a dendrologist, was stationed in Smolensk, where his responsibility was ensuring a supply of the type of wood needed by the Wehrmacht for its purposes. He stated that

I received a telephone call from the chief quartermaster telling me that I was supposed to proceed forthwith to a hospital in the eastern portion of Smolensk. There I was supposed to render an expert statement. The evening was approaching. I proceeded

there, and there I found an international committee, about a dozen gentlemen. Presiding was General Surgeon Holm. General Holm presented to me several fir saplings—as has been mentioned by a previous witness—about 30 or 40 centimeters, one foot and a half in height. There might have been 2 or 3 pieces.

In the first place, I determined the age. To the best of my recollection, it was from about 5 to 7 years. Then I was asked whether the growing process had been a normal one. To this end, a crosscut of the sapling was made and I took a look at the crosscut under a

microscope. There you could clearly see the year rings. Every wooden plants adds every year one ring of wood, which is clearly discernible. Now, it could be easily traced back that one of these yearly rings, 3 years ago, was of a very small size. This year, consequently, the growth of the plant must have been stunted.

Being foresters, we know that every plant, after being transplanted, does not grow normally the first year after the transplanting has been effected because the roots of the plant have to get accustomed to the new soil in which the plant grows. Therefore, I expressed my opinion that 3 years ago—that is, 3 years prior to 1943—something must have happened to the plant.

An opinion supporting Dr.  Orsós position was thus presented by a experienced forester.  

The members of the IMC had left Smolensk shortly afterward and the printed document was presented to them in Białystok, where the plane landed for refueling, and where they signed it.   They then flew on to Berlin where they spent the next several days, once again residing at the Hotel Adlon.

Dr. Zietz commented

Then we had photostatic copies made so that the signatures would also be pictorially visible, and gave one copy to every member.

In the photograph taken upon their return to Berlin, which shows the IMC presenting its protocol in the offices of the German Ministry of Health it is the distinguished professor who is shown presenting it to the Reichgesundheitsfuehrer Conte.

Part of the members of this delegation remained in Berlin for another week, and we further took care of their wishes. For instance, I made an appointment for a visit to the Institute of Forensic Medicine in Berlin; they purchased medical textbooks; they went to look at this or that. Then they individually left Berlin.

But before they left a commemorative photograph of the group with Dr. Zietz and two women, described as being from the Ministry of Health, was taken in front of the Adlon

In the interim others of the Germans were in the midst of preparations for the English-speaking POW visit.

© Krystyna Piórkowska

LITTLE CONIFERS

Among the many reports/notes/commentaries which had been prepared both within the Polish military structure, by the Polish diplomatic  corps, the US Army liaison officers and others, was one prepared by Ambassador Owen O’Malley and submitted to Anthony Eden.

We have in fact perforce used the good name of England like the murderers used the little conifers to cover up a massacre; and in view of the immense importance of an appearance of allied unity and of the heroic resistance of Russia to Germany, few will think that any other course would have been wise or right…

The little conifers were of course the saplings which had been planted by the Soviets to conceal the mass graves among the woods of Kozie Gory.  One of the issues which had been raised was that of the age of the trees.  One cannot in attempting to transplant a nursery tree, transfer it until it is of an appropriate age. The issue of the conifers and their age was raised during the Madden Hearings:

Dr. Tramsen. Yes ; I remember seeing quite a lot of lines of young  fir trees about the height of one-and-a-half foot, and I saw them stretching out from the graves because they had been removed when those graves had been opened possibly.

However  it was not only General von Gersdorff who noted that there had been a personality conflict among the members of the IMC. Dr. Zietz noted that although the other specialists had delegated Dr. Orsós to speak in their name, the process was not without some contention.

It was very interesting to notice, during that discussion as well as during all of the previous discussions, that all of the participants of the committee were unanimous as to a recognition of the international reputation of Dr. Orsos. But even in the course of this issue here there was a clear political difference between the Hungarian and the Rumanian. The Rumanian guest was a lecturer of the Institute of Forensic Medicine at Bucharest, which enjoyed a very good reputation.

His name was Dr. Birkle. He emphasized, however, that he was no German but a full-blooded Rumanian. Dr. Birkle frequently objected to the findings of Dr. Orsos, and frequently found them to be too far reaching or of a too dictatorial nature. All of us frequently smiled at these bickerings, because it was our opinion that this was clearly manifested in former differences about Sienburgen and other parts of the country. This was expressed particularly when the question of these fir trees arose. Birkle said, in essence, as follows:

Professor Orsos, you may be* a really competent doctor of forensic medicine, and you might also be a very good artist, but that you, however, wish to be a very competent botanist, that is going too far."

Yet the fact was that Dr. Orsos was correct and as General von Gersdorff noted, when the group arrived in Smolensk, Dr. Orsos had pulled one of the conifers from his bag and had requested a microscope.   He presented his thesis – the trees were five years old, but had actually been transplanted three years earlier.  Dr. Palmieri from Naples, confirmed the discussion about the trees, and also detailed the issue of brain calcification.

When a certain time has passed from the time of death, the possibility of determining the time of death becomes always more difficult. Therefore one must study the corpse.

Generally, two conclusions may be reached by the magistrate on the time of death and can be determined in two ways : Firstly, when did the person die; secondly, between the two dates which we are giving you which is the most probable. The first question is far more difficult to answer if it is a question of establishing dates which are very near to each other when much time has passed. It is much easier to reach a conclusion on the second question, and this is what was done.

Two dates are possible—April 1940 or October 1941. Between the twoa conclusion on the second question, and this is what was done. Two dates are possible—April 1940 or October 1941. Between the two dates there are 18 months, this allows precise orientation. The answer to the question (1940-41) was influenced by two circumstances: (1) The state of the corpses, and (2) the plant life which had been planted over the bodies. In the bodies, or at least in many of the bodies, Professor Orsos observed the presence of growths (corns)— in the inside of the cranium pseudo-gi"owths in the internal part of the skull which are due to manifestations of reduction of the mineralization of the brain—of the cerebral tissues and of the other substances contained in the skull. In a special publication of Professor Orsos in 1934 he had called attention to the fact that these cerebral growths are noticeable on bodies which have been dead for at least 2 years. Orsos had been a prisoner of the Russians during the First World War and had been in Siberia and there had made these special studies which he published in 1934.

Secondly, the question of the plants concerns the age of these plants. It is a fact that one notes when a tree is cut that each year a circle is noted for its age. There was this coincidence and led to the conclusion from a technical point of view, and there were others which are not technical arguments, for instance, material found in the pockets—letters, newspapers, diaries—none of these had a date later than April 1940. This was not a medical question.

Thus there were two external scientific determinations made by the group, in addition to the circumstantial evidence of the diaries, letters and newspapers which were found on the corpses.  No other conclusion was possible, but that the Soviets were guilty.

© Krystyna Piórkowska

PUBLISHING THE PROTOCOL

It is amazing when one considers what efforts and material resources were allocated by both the Germans and the Soviets to their propaganda efforts.  When Stalin decided it was appropriate books were published during the siege of Leningrad and the battle of Kursk that made the materials published in Britain under the “Wartime Economy Standards” provision look positively poverty stricken.

But the Germans continuously published Signal in color and despite the difficulties involved in preparing the bi-weekly magazine in a multitude (25) languages they used a complex layout which differed on each page of the publication and which included photos, charts and other images in addition to text.  In the issue of June 2, 1943 was the second issue to carry information about Katyn. That issue contained sixteen photographs from Katyn, including images of the IMC members.

That issue also contained an image of the signed page of the protocol.  The protocol itself had been produced in three languages (German, Polish and English) and had been reproduced so rapidly that it was delivered to the IMC members in Białystok, where they signed it.  The page with their signatures did not simply remain as part of the record, it too was reproduced, photostatically, so that each and every signature was viewable by all those who received a copy of the report.  This was a way of documenting that the scientists had truly agreed and supported the opinions contained therein.

Prof. Dr. Orsós clearly did take on much of the responsibility and did function as chair and secretary, as he noted he had noted all the remarks of the members of the IMC – unfortunately no copy of those notes has yet been located. The Germans must have assigned a secretary to the group, since he states that he dictated the report to a person who must have typed it.

I would like to add something. We discussed all the matters the whole afternoon in every detail after we had finished with the post mortems. I wrote down every remark made by all the members of the commission. Then I dictated the medical part of the protocol.

We finished up at 3 o'clock in the morning. Then we went to the mess hall. Some of my colleagues had already gone to bed. And very early in the morning we left on our return flight in three planes. The protocol had been read out to us in this mess hall, in this canteen, the manuscript, the draft, and when we reached the town of Bialystok on our return flight, a military plane caught up with us with mimeographed copies of the protocol. There, at that place, we had about one and a half hours to read through the protocols and to sign them, and then we continued our return flight to Berlin.

Prof. Dr. Ferenc Orsós of Budapest, who was born in 1879, was not the oldest in the group; that distinction belonged to Dr. Reimond Speelers of Ghent University, who was three years older.  However, the professor’s experience and fame were such that in the absence of the Germans first choice, it was Orsós whom they described as chairing the commission.  However, Orsós was a man of principle and he did not officially assume the mantle of chairmanship despite being described as such, with his concern apparently arising from his desire to avoid publicity.  However, during their testimony, Dr. Tramsen noted that Orsós had been chair, not only because of his knowledge, but also because he knew Russian.  (Surprisingly, Tramsen omitted the fact that the Rumanian, Dr. Aleksandru Birkle had been born in Russia.)  In fact, Dr. Orsós did speak to the local witnesses in Russian. 

However, more importantly, Prof. Orsós was the source for several of the most significant of the conclusions which the commission agreed to-  the first was the process of brain calcification, which was an extremely new methodology used to determine the time of death.  It primarily dealt with process of changes which occurred to the brain when the body lay in sandy soil, which is precisely the type of soil found in Kozie Gory.  Dr. Tramsen had been aware of this methodology for setting the date of death, but it was under Dr. Orsós’ guidance that the group began to examine the skulls that they had removed from the grave site.

Yes. We examined several of the insides of the skulls which were brought to Smolensk from the tombs after the post mortems, and Professor Orsos of Budapest, who is a specialist in doing post mortems in regard to deciding the time of death, had instructed us as- to a new manner of examining the inside of a skull which has been interred for a long time. I had read about this method but had never practiced it before.

Dr. Zietz described the second issue in which Dr. Orsós was most instrumental in having the group decide about.  This other aspect that the professor dealt with was the age of the conifers which had been planted on the grave site.  These were of course the conifers

"Professor Orsos, you may be* a really competent doctor of forensic medicine, and you might also be a very good artist, but that you, however, wish to be a very competent botanist, that is going too far."

Now, Professor Orsos demanded that his theory be adopted. I mean, the theory about the 3 and 2 years, respectively. Then one of the participants asked whether or not there was a forestry expert of the army group present. Professor Buhtz replied in the affirmative, and called up from the very same room that a forestry expert should report at once. He actually appeared within a few minutes, and he had no inkling as to what he was supposed to say.

The young forester’s presence was also described by General von Gersdorf.

© Krystyna Piórkowska