REMARKS ON VANDERBILT KATYN PAPER – PART III

Footnote 105 –

that is not the language of the message – it is rather Stewart’s approximation of his message. A slight but significant difference.

“These messages were subsequently forwarded to Washington and provided first hand acknowledgement in July 1943 that Western forensics believed the Soviet Union was guilty…”  T

Neither Van Vliet nor Stewart were forensic specialists and I have no idea where this idea is taken from. I would appreciate learning where there is any documentation of either of them being a forensic specialist.

Further, the messages were not subsequently forwarded to Washington – please read the AP story of September 10, 2012 where this is described with some accuracy.   The code users were referred to as registered – because they were registered and all POW letters went through a specific Post Office – so they went to MIS-X BEFORE they got to Detroit. 

Van Vliet’s coded letters have yet to be located in the NA – but both Stewart and VV sent coded letters.  In fact, as Big X in Oflag 64, it was Van Vliet who arranged for hand guns to be shipped into the camp.

PLEASE – there were three John Van Vliet’s in the US Army over the years – and this one was Jr.  – it is important to differentiate.

Problematically, these several pages omit the entire fact that the two US Army officers were part of a group of eight men ordered taken to Katyn, and that of the eight at least three others left reports or other records behind confirming their opinion or where they were unable to do so, because of British MI-9 pressure – of not accusing the Germans.  They were not all officers, not even were they all military.

“…the other American officer, a West Point graduate, who was taken from his prisoner of war camp…” Both Van Vliet and Stewart were West Point graduates, and both were POWs and both were held in the same camp.

“At the end of the trip the Germans tried to get a statement ….. but all the men refused…” The men had acknowledged the “terrible implications” when they were brought to Berlin, prior to departure for Katyn.  That is why when each of them was questioned PRIOR TO THE TRIP – each refused to aid and abet, that is why when the Senior Officer was asked to sign a parole, he refused and that is why four of the men in the original group of twelve were returned to their camps.   None of this was secret as it is part of the Madden testimony.

“Many of the men who were brought with Van Vliet by the Germans were not medical personnel.”  To be accurate – the sentence should read –“Insofar as we currently know; only one of the eight men in the group brought to the massacre site was a medical man.

“However, a British medical captain was with the Americans….and the Nazi methodology.” This sentence implies a predominance of Americans in the group – yet the Americans were only two out of eight. What Nazi methodology – the doctor never made a reference to Nazi methodology.

“None of this information was reported before the end of the war….”  Yes, this information was reported prior to the end of the war – in November of 1944 and the report was forwarded by the British to the State Dept.

Page 40 –

“Upon his release in 1945, Van Vliet filed a report …. with US Army Intelligence in Berlin.”

Van Vliet was never in Berlin in 1945.  Period. He did not file a report in Berlin.  In fact he did not file a report in Europe.  He reported to certain individuals, in some cases in lesser in some cases in greater detail – but there was no written report.   To file a report is a clear indication of a written document.  He was questioned (as I discovered in November 2013) under oath – and thus submitted a sworn deposition.  A highly significant document, with many legal implications, however, not a report.

“…Van Vliet was handed a gag order by Maj. Gen. Bissell….”  By quoting, not from Van Vliet’s testimony there is a miscontrual – Van Vliet testified clearly, that he was aware that people knew he had been in Katyn, he and Stewart had managed, all the time were in the Oflag to avoid discussing the matter.  He wanted to have formal protection to keep him from being questioned in a post-war world and he requested an order binding him to secrecy. 

“The Van Vliet Report…. and subsequently was ‘deep sixed’ in the military intelligence archives by Maj. Gen. Bissell…”  The fact is that there is no proof that Maj. General Bissell ever deep sixed the report.  There is, in the newly declassified information enough to counter that allegation that I would suggest that one would want to refrain from making it as a blanket assertion.

“…FDR asked Earle to use his contacts in the Balkans and Poland to try and discover who was really responsible for the massacre.  From the Embassy Earle would send hundreds of pages of material from his sources…..” 

This highly unusual statement intrigues me, as until now I had never seen a statement that FDR has asked Earle to use his contacts in Poland.  Perhaps, I missed something.  Could I ask for a scan or a direct link to a document that refers to this?  Also although Earle sent a multitude of items, I never tallied it in the hundreds of pages.  Is there a specific chart or table totaling these items?  I would be grateful if I could have access to that.

However, with respect to Earle’s expulsion to Samoa – he also noted that when he was brought back, shortly after FDR’s demise – the Naval Commanders’ (technically Earle served in the Navy) apologized to him.  If correct, this would imply a split between the military and the administration on their view of the Soviet Union.

Page 45-6

“The success of the Soviets made it very likely that the Red Army would liberate Poland and Eastern Europe, thereby putting Roosevelt at a marked disadvantage.”  This sentence avoids several facts – the first that the Red Army victory was to be based on the materiel and supplies received in the Lend Lease program and without with which Stalin had nothing.  Thus Roosevelt chose to use American materiel and supplies as an offset for the sacrifice of various ethnic groups which were ordered sent ahead of the Red Army to serve as cannon fodder.  It also avoids discussion of the fact that when it was possible for the US Army to liberate all of Germany – they were pulled back some 100 miles.  The refusal to implement and attack through the Balkans can be similarly viewed – FDR had made a decision to offer up Eastern and South Eastern Europe to Stalin – as FDR told Archbishop Spellman well PRIOR to Teheran – “The European people will simply have to endure the Soviet domination…”

Roosevelt chose to be at a disadvantage – he did not have to be at one.  (Apologies for my digression into a commentary on theories.)

Page 46
The remarks of the Polish government are presented without any indication that the Poles did other than simply complain and demand during the war.  There is no mention of the Polish Army under British Command in any of its aspects or the Polish RAF Squadrons.

Footnote 134 – “…the lands that were being so passionately demanding … had been taken from the Soviet Union during a war with the Soviet Union…”

There is no mention of the fact that the Bolsheviks (not yet the Soviet Union) had attacked Poland, no mention of the fact that these lands had historically been Polish for hundreds of years, that culturally and educationally they were linked with Poland over the generations.  Stalin’s grievance was over the fact that due to his error in judgment –what he saw as a sure victory was lost in that war.  Not these lands – but all the lands of Poland that he wanted to occupy.

Page 51

Footnote 151 – Soviet Army on the banks of the Vistula – members of the 1^st Polish Army asked for permission to cross the river and join and were denied.

Footnote 152 – Use of Soviet airbases during the Uprising – the Soviets did not allow Americans to refuel on Soviet territory, thus many missions ended with the pilots crashing.  They were often aided by local Polish citizens who helped them make it out.  Others were not so lucky.

 Page 52 –

“Instead the London government lost its only military power in Poland.”  This statement equates the Home Army units in Warsaw with the totality of the Home Army units in all of Poland. I would suggest that this is an extreme statement and incorrect.

Appendix – what is referred to as booklet forwarded by Earle – I would posit looks like the material published in Signal in a multiplicity of languages and easily available to be verified.  Not verifying the origins of this material is disappointing ‘honors’ work.