As originally planned by the Germans, the POW group was to consist of fourteen men
- Five officers (including the two US Army and the three British officers),
- Three „other ranks” from the British Dominions,
- Four US Army enlisted men,
- Two British civilians
Capt. Gilder noted that the German commander of the Lazarette stated that he would travel alone. Frank Stroobant was confronted with a difficult choice. Taken to the camp commandant’s office, where he was informed, through the interpreter, that he was selected to go:
I gathered that an order had been received from the High Command under which British and American officers were to be “invited” to visit the mass grave at Katyn. Two responsible civilian internees were also to be included in the party.
He was further advised that after their return the witnesses
…would be required to give an undertaking to render an account of their reactions and findings after the visit, possibly over the German radio, write articles for the German newspapers and visit prisoner of war camps to lecture about the scene. (The last would have been the hardest part of the undertaking to fulfill, for anyone can imagine the kind of reception which would have been given to any British national, especially a civilian internee, engaged on such a mission.)
Immediately I understood what was wanted I refused to meet their request or co-operate with them in any way. I was then told that if I persisted in this attitude, volunteers from British internees would be called for on the morning parade, and from those men the Germans would make their own selection...
Stroobant clearly understood how the selection that the Germans might make could look:
They could easily pick out the man who would be prepared to jettison his British loyalty for the odd Reichsmarks, schnapps and fauleins that would be thrown in.
In such a case, the only possible choice that Stroobant could make was to reconcile himself to the German demand that he go.
Stroobant also gives a detailed description of his trip to Berlin
The short statement in Van Vliet’s report solely informs us that the building was located near Tiergarten, where, the officers were taken for walks. In his later article (1962) Van Vliet writes about
Grim prison fortress overlooking the river Spree.
In his report, Gilder informs us:
I was taken the next morning to a house in Schlieffen-Ufer , Berlin
The most extensive description of the building does come from Stroobant’s book:
…we were housed in a tall building near a canal, and not far from a bridge, which seemed to carry the main road to one of Berlin
On the basis of these descriptions and the aid of a 1945 map of Berlin Molke Bridge Spree River
The situation of the POWs was a difficult one. Stevenson, Van Vliet and Stewart, who were all imprisoned in the same camp, Oflag IX A/Z, of course knew each other, as did Gilder and Suttie (if one accepts the identification of Suttie), but Stroobant was not known to anyone. Gilder was treated with suspicion by the three officers, until one of the British ‘other ranks’ confirmed his bona fides, which was then accepted by the other officers. Additionally, the officers were placed on a different floor, separated from the enlisted men and Stroobant, which complicated efforts at discrete communication between the groups. Information had to be transmitted during quick meetings, or by means of an intermediary, although Stroobant mentions that Stevenson did speak with him privately. As becomes clear from Gilder’s report, an enlisted New Zealander served as a batman, or orderly for the officers; perhaps the officers were able to convince him to transmit messages between the groups.
Among the arriving groups were also the four
During the course of this day, while the POWs were held at the Arbeits-Kommando, each of them was individually questioned by a group of German officers, among whom we only know the name of Captain Bentmann, who chaired Gilder’s hearing. During the course of these hearings, each POW, separately and individually – but according to their previously agreed upon plan, refused to cooperate with the Germans:
We cautioned the entire group to do no talking, to give no indications of opinion, and not to cooperate in any way with the Germans. All agreed. It was evident to all of us that we were involved in an international mess with terrific political implications..
Colonel Stevenson also refused to sign a parole for the group, which would have obliged all of them to not escape during the trip. What is most curious, is that the German officers did not punish any of the ‘refuseniks’ and limited themselves to only threatening the POWs, and that if necessary they would transport them to Katyn by force.
Colonel Stevenson also refused to sign a parole for the group, which would have obliged all of them to not escape during the trip. What is most curious, is that the German officers did not punish any of the ‘refuseniks’ and limited themselves to only threatening the POWs, and that if necessary they would transport them to Katyn by force.
Such a vapid response – as compared to Nazi „standards” – to the POWs resistance, could possibly be explained. From the very start, the formation of the group did not go well, and by the time of the
It has been erroneously stated that the decision about non-cooperation was made during the journey to Smolensk
© Krystyna Piórkowska
